Daca ar fi sa descriu cel mai bine situatia din 1940, cele doua mesaje diplomatice de mai jos ar fi suficiente:
Aceste mesaje sunt din arhiva diplomatica germana, capturata si tradusa de aliati.
Seria D(1937-1945, volumul X, 23 iunie- 31 august 1940.
Sursa aici;
https://histdoc.net/history/German_diplomacy%201939-1941.html
Drama Romaniei e foarte bine descrisa in cartea lui Andreas Hillgruber, “Hitler,regele Carol si Maresalul Antonescu” , sursa aici:
Avantajul lui Hillgruber este ca a fost soldat german in 1943-1945, traise acele timpuri,a tiparit cartea in 1954, prima editie, a doua editie in 1965, beneficiind de posibilitatea discutiilor cu cei care fusesera implicati in evenimentele din timpul razboiului.Departe de mine gandul ca sa reusesc o imagine complete asupra evenimentelor, vreau sa arat doar atitudinile unor tari implicate in prabusirea Romaniei Mari in iunie 1940, atitudini descrise de Hillgruber.
Marea Britanie
La 12 iunie 1940, noul ambassador al Marii Britanii, Stafford Cripps, se intalneste cu Molotov.La 13 iulie 1940 isi prezinta scrisorile de acreditare lui Stalin si ii face propunerea extraordinara prezentata in mesajul diplomatic german.Ulterior Molotov le-a comunicat germanilor propunerile britanice.
Churchill il invita pe Stalin in Balcani,unificarea si leadershipul tarilor din Balcani era sarcina numai a Uniunii Sovietice. ba chiar considera ca interesele Uniunii Sovietice in Stramtori trebuiau securizate.
Ce mai poti comenta aici, Churchill i-a cedat lui Stalin toata regiunea, inclusiv Stramtorile
Hillgruber mai citeaza un autor , Korkisch Friedrich, care afirma ca Bulgaria a multumit dupa recuperarea Cadrilaterului nu numai guvernului Germaniei,ci si guvernelor URSS si Marii Britanii.(pagina 203).
GERMANIA
Germania a incheiat pactul Ribbentrop-Molotov in 23 august 1939, pact ce avea un protocol secret, la unul din puncte scria:
“3. În ceea ce privește sud-estul Europei, partea sovietică subliniază interesul URSS pentru Basarabia. Partea germană își declară dezinteresul politic complet față de aceste regiuni.”
De aici au pornit neintelegerile, sovieticii l-au interpretat cum au vrut. Ribbentrop a motivat in 24 iunie 1940, dupa pretentiile sovieticilor asupra Bucovinei:
“Dupa cum imi aduc aminte, lucrurile s-au petrecut astfel: la delimitarea sferelor de interes ale ambelor parti in sud-estul Europei,partea sovietica, atunci cand s-a mentionat sud-estul Europei,a subliniat interesul pentru Basarabia.Cu acest prilej, eu am subliniat dezinteresul fata de problema basarabeana. Dar, pentru a evita o posibila indiscretie,care nu era exclusa,intrucat atunci relatiile germane-ruse nu erau pe deplin clarificate,eu am optat pentru o formula generala in protocol,astfel incat sa nu fie formulate in scris pretentiile rusesti asupra Basarabiei.Cand s-au discutat problemele Sud-Estului European,am declarat la modul foarte general,ca din punct de vedere politic,Germania nu este deloc interesata de “aceste regiuni” , adica de sud-estul Europei. Interesul economic al Germaniei pentru aceste regiuni sud-europene eu l-am exprimat destul de clar la timpul sau. Aceasta era in conformitate cu formularea generala recomandata de Fuhrer referitor la Sud-Estul European,precum si dupa cum imi amintesc, cu indicatia speciala data de Fuhrer inainte de plecarea mea la Moscova,prin care Fuhrerul ma imputernicea sa declar dezinteresul german pentru regiunile din sud-estul Europei si eventual chiar pana la Constantinopol.Dar problema Constantinopolului nu a fost abordata.”
In decembrie 1939 Canaris ajunge in Romania pentru a discuta despre sabotajele din Romania in exploatarea petrolului romanesc . Se infiinteaza un serviciu de paza format din civili germani care avea si sarcina de a facilita parasutarea de trupe in zona petrolifera romaneasca.Ulterior Moruzov si-a dat acordul pentru functionarea acestui serviciu.
La inceputul anului 1940 armata germana incepe sa lucreze la un plan de interventie in Romania pentru apararea zonei petrolifere in caz de atac al aliatilor dinspre Salonic. La 7 aprilie 1940 maiorul german Eberhard Kinzel sosea in Ungaria pentru a purta convorbiri neoficiale cu Statul Major Ungar, avand aprobarea lui Hitler.
Ulterior ungurii au comunicat italienilor despre convorbiri. Ce anume au inteles ungurii din vizita lui Kinzel se gaseste in Jurnalul lui Ciano, ginerele lui Mussolini si ministrul sau de externe:
April 8, 1940
There is alarm in Budapest. Teleki has sent to Rome one of his messengers, Mr. Baranay, to inform us of an approach made by the German General Staff to the Hungarian General Staff.On the pretext that Russia will soon move into Bessarabia, Germany intends to occupy the Rumanian oil fields and asks for free passage through Hungary. The price for this permission would be Transylvania. For the Hungarians there arises the problem either of letting the Germans pass, or opposing them with force. In either case Hungarian liberty would come to an end. Acceptance would spare them devastation and ruin, while fighting, though more painful for the moment, would prepare for a future rebirth. Villani and Baranay advocated resistance and hoped for Italian aid. I accompanied them to the Duce, who reserved his answer, though in principle he advised acceptance. He repeated to them, also, that he stands firmly with Germany, that he is getting ready to fight against the French and English. We have sent a telegram to Berlin to learn how much truth there is in what the Hungarians say. Nobody has told us anything; in fact, the Germans have so far assured us of exactly the opposite. But experience proves that this doesn’t mean very much.
April 9, 1940
They did not march in the direction of Rumania. A secretary of the German Embassy, who came to my house at two o’clock in the morning, bearing a letter from Mackensen, asked to be received at seven o’clock in the morning. Nothing else. He arrived at six-thirty, pale and tired, and communicated Hitler’s decision to occupy Denmark and Norway, adding that this decision had already been acted upon. He made no comments, but agreed with me wholeheartedly when I told him that the reaction of the neutrals, and especially of the Americans, would be violent. Then we went to the Duce to give him a written message from Hitler – the usual letter, in the usual style, announcing what he had already done. Mussolini said, „I approve Hitler’s action wholeheartedly. It is a gesture that can have incalculable results, and this is the way to win wars. The democracies have lost the race. I shall give orders to the press and to the Italian people to applaud this German action without reservation.” Mackensen went out of the Palazzo Venezia glowing. Later, I returned with the Hungarians to Mussolini. Attolico has denied the rumor of an attack on Rumania. The Duce advised, therefore, that the Hungarians keep calm and moderate, and that they accede to the German requests. This was not the answer the Hungarians expected and hoped for. They went so far as to ask whether, in the case of military resistance, they could count on Italian help. Mussolini smiled. „How could this ever be,” he said, „since I am Hitler’s ally and intend to remain so?”
Hiilgruber afirma ca actiunea “ciudata” a Ungariei probabil ca a a urmarit reinnoirea pretentiilor asupra Transilvaniei si ca au existat “lucruri false” in aceasta actiune.
Si a urmat fatidica declaratie a lui Molotov din 23 iunie 1940 catre ambasadorul german din Moscova,care apare in arhivele germane:
“Molotov made the following statement to me today : The solution of the Bessarabian question brooked no further delay. The Soviet Government was still striving for a peaceful solution, but it was de termined to use force, should the Rumanian Government decline a peaceful agreement. The Soviet claim likewise extended to Bucovina, which had a Ukrainian population. “
In aceasi zi ambasadorul Schulenburg mai face precizari:
“For the Reich Minister personally.
With reference to my telegram No. 1205 of June 23. Referring to our conversation of today regarding Bessarabia, Molotov just sent me word that the Soviet Government would wait until and including June 25th for the German Government’s stand in the matter. “
Vine si raspunsul lui Ribbentrop catre Molotov:
Raspunsul URSS se gaseste in telegrama de la inceputul articolului, sovieticii renuntau la jumatate din Bucovina. Despre returnarea tezaurului, nici vorba.A urmat ultimatumul sovietic si cedarea Basarabiei si a Bucovinei de Nord.
Germanii si-au urmarit interesele, serviciile secrete germane stiau de intentia autoritatilor romane de a distruge industria petrolifera in caz de atac, asa ca o nava cu “turisti” se gasea pe Dunare, pregatiti in orice moment sa ocupe depozitul de explozibili destinate distrugerii industriei petrolifere (Hillgruber, pagina 156). De asemenea au reusit evacuarea populatiei germane din Basarabia si Bucovina de Nord, 93548 din Basarabia si 43538 din Bucovina de Nord. La 1 iulie 1941 au mai gasit 2058 de germani in Basarabia si 3446 in Bucovina de Nord.
Hillgruber mai aminteste de memorandumul ambasadorului Schulenburg din 21 septembrie 1940 , unde Molotov afirma ca renuntarea URSS la partea de sud a Bucovinei era doar temporara. Sa examinam documentul:
Mai apare si dezacordul sovieticilor despre garantiile germane date Romaniei la Dictatul de la Viena, cand am cedat partea de N-V a Transilvaniei.Hitler garantase atunci frontierele Romaniei dupa rezolvarea diferndelor teritoriale cu Ungaria si Bulgaria.
In documentele traduse apar niste precizari de subsol care sustin idea ca Molotov dorea toata Bucovina si conta pe sprijinul german ca in viitor acest lucru sa se realizeze
( Hilger era “Counselor of Embassy”) :
Ungaria
Ungurii doreau toata Transilvania, dupa Dictatul de la Viena cand a trebuit sa le cedam teritorii, ei erau tot nemultumiti. Aparuse si oportunitatea din aprilie 1940 ,cand germanii aveau nevoie de Ungaria pentru a preveni un atac asupra zonei petrolifere romanesti, in caz de conflict romano-sovietic aveau numai de castigat daca se implicau militar. Hillgruber afirma la pagina 92 :
“ Cu prilejul vizitei ministrului de externe Italian de externe, contele Galeazzo Ciano, la Budapesta ,la 19-20 decembrie 1938, Horthy,regentul ungar , a vorbit deschis despre “posibilitatea unui atac impotriva Romaniei” ,afirmand ca el are asentimentul ducelui pentru aceasta actiune. “.
Asteptau inca din 1938 ocazia unui atac impotriva Romaniei.
Bulgaria
Tot la pagina 92 Hillbruber afirma
“Pretentiile Bulgariei asupra Dobrogei au fost formulate de tarul Boris III pentru prima oara la 20 noiembrie 1938 fata de ministrul plenipotentiar german Eugen Rumelin, in momentul in care s-a anuntat vizita regelui Carol la Hitler.In convorbirea cu contele Ciano,la 26 ianuarie 1939,Boris III a cerut din nou retrocedarea Dobrogei.”
Jurnalul lui Ciano:
“January 26,1939
Long conversation with the King of Bulgaria. I had not met him before. My first impression was not good, in view of his physical appearance. My later impression was better. We spoke at length about the international situation, with particular reference to the Danubian basin and the Balkans. He asked for news about my trip to Yugoslavia, and he spoke about his agreement with this country with such feeling that I had the impression he was sincere. He was very bitter against Rumania, but his violence was such as would be expressed by a lymphatic person. He wants the province of Dobruja, and he wants it particularly because there is great Irredentist agitation. He spoke also of an outlet on the Aegean Sea, but added that this must be considered as the second step in the settlement of Bulgarian claims.”
Dupa ultimatumul sovietic bulgarii au inceput sa se agite asa cum apare intr-un memorandum german din 27 iunie 1940
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Berlin, June 27, 1940.
The Bulgarian Minister called on me today and stated that he had been instructed by his Government to make inquiries with us about the development of the Bessarabian crisis and at the same time to as certain our views as to the further treatment of the Bulgarian wishes. M. Draganov was even informed about the state of affairs up to the Rumanian Crown Council’s meeting, about whose outcome we ourselves had no certain information up to that time. As to further treatment of the Bulgarian wishes, I informed the Minister in accordance with the instruction of the Foreign Minister that it was our urgent desire that Bulgaria should not take advantage of the present crisis to achieve her wishes. The Minister was very disappointed by this answer. He added—and as he expressly stated not on instruction of his Government—that the King and the Bulgarian Government would find themselves in an extremely difficult situation if they did not take advantage of the present moment. Given a peaceful solution, public opinion might perhaps be easier to restrain than in case of a military one. What disturbed him especially was the danger that Bulgaria might now receive the Dobruja as a gift from the hands of the Soviet Union rather than from Germany, although he readily conceded that the entire present situation was a result of the German victories. M. Draganov then strongly insisted on obtaining some assurances for the future, perhaps in the sense that Germany recognized the justice of the Bulgarian demands for southern Dobruja and promised to bring about their realization when the time came. Finally, the Minister promised to telegraph his Government at once of the Reich Foreign Minister’s desire that Bulgaria should keep peace at the present.
WOERMANN
Deja bulgarii evocau posibilitatea primirii Dobrogei de la sovietici. Ulterior bulgarii au insistat cu pretentiile teritoriale asa cum arata un document din 27 iulie 1940
“Record of the Conversation Between the Reich Foreign Minister
and Bulgarian Minister President Filov, in the Presence of
Bulgarian Foreign Minister Popov, at Fuschl, on July 27, 1940”
„[…] The Bulgarian Minister President pointed out once more that no direct negotiations had taken place to date, but that Rumania had only made promises to settle the entire question after the conclusion of the European war. He stated that he on his part also took a skeptical view of the Rumanians’ sincerity, adding, besides, that the southern
Dobruja was a Bulgarian region of 7,500 square kilometers, where in the year 1913 there were only 6000 Rumanian inhabitants in a total population of 300,000. Now the situation had changed as a result of Rumanian colonization. In the Dobruja there were 150,000 Bulgarians, 80 to 90,000 Rumanians and 70,000 Turks. Relinquishing the
northern Dobruja, Bulgaria wished to limit her revisionist demands only to the southern Dobruja, that is, to the boundaries which had existed in the year 1913. For Bulgaria the question of the Dobruja had a very strong sentimental aspect. In the World War, Bulgarian and German soldiers had fought side by side under Mackensen, and,
for instance, captured the city of Silistria. After the cession of the Dobruja, the Bulgarian population had on flimsy grounds been deprived of half of its land by the Rumanians through a nefarious land law. Such a procedure was unparalleled in recent history. A hun
dred years ago the French had applied it in Algeria.
At the moment the Bulgarian population of the Dobruja was being terrorized by the Rumanians. Its most essential articles of necessity were being requisitioned and now, due to the unbearable conditions in the Dobruja, refugees from there had arrived in Bulgaria. In the circumstances Bulgaria could on no account accept anything approach
ing a compromise, content herself with half the territory and for the rest allow herself to be bought off with an exchange of populations. An exchange of populations was entirely out of the question. Bulgaria simply did not have the land for settlement at its disposal and on that account had to insist in all circumstances on full restitution of the southern Dobruja.
The conversation was concluded after lasting 40 minutes.”
In momentul ultimatumului sovietic din 26 iunie 1940 Romania era intr-o situatie dezastruoasa: un URSS foarte agresiv, care miza si pe sprijinul german, servicii secrete germane aflate deja in Romania , pregatite sa intervina pentru a opri distrugerea zonei petrolifere, o Ungarie cu pretentii teritoriale. o Bulgarie cu pretentii teritoriale.Ca si cand nu era de ajuns ,Churchill dorea sa rupa alianta germane-sovietica si dadea la schimb inclusiv Constantinopolul, nu doar Romania.
Mai exista si o granita sovieto-ungara in nord , cu posibilitati de coordonare a armatelor respective, un conflict militar cu sovieticii aducea riscuri imense , Romania nu avea nici macar sprijinul Marii Britanii, care ne garantase granitele la un moment dat.
EPILOG
Asa cum apare in documentele germane, odata cu Dictatul de la Viena din august 1940, Germania acorda garantii frontierelor Romaniei.
Acorda si Italia garantii, dar nu erau asa importante. Aceste garantii germane au avut efecte pe termen scurt si lung.
Pe termen lung,consecintele au aparut odata cu patrunderea Armatei Rosii pe teritoriul Romaniei in 1944, ca si cu retragerea diviziilor blindate germane din Romania, dupa victoria de la Targu-Frumos din primavara lui 1944. Romania nu mai avea nici o obligatie de a continua razboiul alaturi de Germania.
Ideea ca Romania a tradat Germania in august 1944 nu are fundament, garantiile germane nu mai valorau nimic, asa ca Romania nu mai avea nici o obligatie de a continua lupta alaturi de trupele germane.
Antonescu dorea si el iesirea din alianta cu Germania, a dorit ca aceasta iesire sa fie facuta in conditii cat mai bune, nu se punea problema continuarii luptei alaturi de germani pana la sfarsitul razboiului.
Pe termen scurt, au aparut complicatii germane-sovietice. In noiembrie 1940 au loc niste convorbiri Hitler-Molotov in Germania, convorbiri foarte interesante:
Din acest memorandum se poate cita, el este foarte lung, cu multe pasaje interesante:
Avem un citat:
Al doilea citat:
Al treilea citat:
Memorandumul e mult mai lung, am selectat cateva pasaje.
Ce se observa: sovieticii erau foarte deranjati de garantiile germane date Romaniei.
Ce mai cerea Molotov:
“Moreover, the Soviet Union had expressed its dissatisfaction to Rumania that the latter had accepted the guarantee of Germany and Italy without consultation with Russia.. The Soviet Government had already explained its position twice, and it was of the opinion that the guarantee was aimed against the interests of Soviet Russia, „if one might express oneself so bluntly.” Therefore, the question of revoking this guarantee came up. To this the Fuhrer had declared that for a certain time it was necessary and its removal therefore impossible. This affected the interests of the Soviet Union as a Black Sea power.”
Cerea revocarea garantiilor germane date Romaniei!
Molotov mai evoca posibilitatea unor garantii sovietice acordate Bulgariei!
Spre uimirea lui Hitler care il intreba pe Molotov daca bulgarii au cerut asa ceva, Hitler afirmand ca nu stia nimic de vreo cerere a bulgarilor .Mai vorbea Molotov de o iesire a Bulgariei catre Marea Egee
“whereas on the other hand Russia was prepared ro guarantee Bulgaria an outlet to the Aegean Sea.”
Molotov afirma interesul sovietic pentru sudul Bucovinei, desi Hitler ii tot atragea atentia ca Bucovina nu facuse parte din Pactul din august 1939 si ca Bucovina era un fost teritoriu austriac si era in sfera de influenta germana, conform unei intelegeri verbale.Hitler mai vorbea de modificarea Conventiei de la Montreux in favoarea sovieticilor , ii asigura ca trupele germane se vor retrage din Romania la sfarsitul razboiului, iar pentru chestiunea garantiilor sovietice pentru Bulgaria afirma va avea nevoie de opinia lui Mussolini.
In 13 noiembrie 1940 mai are loc o convorbire Ribbentrop – Molotov in care Ribbentropp propune un pact pe 10 ani intre Axa Germania-Italia-Japonia si URSS.
Ribbentropp mai facea referire la Romania:
“The granting of the German guarantee to Rumania had apparently been misconstrued by Moscow. He wanted to repeat again, therefore, that at that time it was a matter of averting through quick action a clash between Hungary and Rumania. If he, the Reich Foreign Minister, had not intervened at that time, Hungary would have marched against Rumania. On the other hand, Rumania could not have been induced to cede so much territory, if the Rumanian Government had not been strengthened by the territorial guarantee. In all its decisions the German Government was guided solely by the endeavor to preserve peace in the Balkans and to prevent England from gaining a foothold there and :from interfering with supplies to Germany. Thus our action in the Balkans was motivated exclusively by the circumstances of our war against England. As soon as England conceded her defeat and asked for peace, German interests in the Balkans would be confined exclusively to the economic field, and German troops would be withdrawn from Rumania.”
Si vine si contraoferta sovietica:
Sovieticii cereau printre altele ,retragerea trupelor germane din Finlanda, plasarea Bulgariei in sfera lor de influenta, baze terestre si navale sovietice in zona Bosfor si Dardanele.
Churchill afirma in memoriile sale:
Book Two, Capitolul 14 , “Germany and Russia “
“To do him justice, Stalin tried his very best to work loyally and faithfully with Hitler, while at the same time gathering all the strength he could in the enormous mass of Soviet Russia. He and Molotov sent their dutiful congratulations on every German victory. They poured a heavy flow of food and essential raw materials into the Reich. Their Fifth Column Communists did what they could to disturb our factories.”
Baiat bun Stalin, mare rusine ca nu l-am inteles cum trebuie!
Referindu-se la contraoferta sovieticilor sovieticilor, Churchill afirma:
Churchill afirma ca sovieticii nu au primit nici un raspuns la contraoferta.
In schimb, in 18 decembrie 1940 Hitler emite directiva 21:
In concluzie, orice alianta sau garantii au limitele lor.Pentru a preveni surprize neplacute e nevoie de o armata puternica , o forta militara care sa inspire inamicilor respect si teama. Din nefericire nu era cazul Romaniei in 1940.Hillgruber mentioneaza la pagina 132 care era parerea germanilor despre Romania:
Am copiat pasajele din carte pentru a arata cum era privita Romania in 1939.
Despre atitudinea Marii Britanii se poate cita Lordul Palmerston, prim-ministru britanic in secoulu XIX:
“We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”
speech, House of Commons, 1 March 1848
Interesul lui Churchill a fost ruperea aliantei germane-sovietice. A reusit pana la urma, sovieticii l-au luat in serios si au pretins Bulgaria si Stramtorile.Pentru Churchill a fost un succes, pentru Romania a insemnat pierderi teritoriale, pierderi umane si materiale imense.Intr-un final Romania a ajuns tranzactionata pe un servetel de hartie intre Churchill si Stalin, in octombrie 1944, trecuta 90% Russia.
Dar tranzactionarea Romaniei se facuse demult.
Caudillo.