Sau ce-si face Ursul cu mana lui… Iskander-M
E aproape stabilit: instalatia Aegis Ashore de la Deveselu va primi mijloace de aparare anti-aeriana, impotriva avioanelor si rachetelor de croaziera. Va fi o capacitate aditionala, in fara celei de baza, anti-balistice, asigurata de interceptorii SM-3.
Decizia a fost provocata de mutarile gresite facute de Rusia, accelerate in ultimul timp. Primul pas a fost facut in 2007, cand Rusia a testat o racheta de croaziera lansata de la sol cu o raza de actiune mai mare de cei 500 de km permisi de tratatul INF care urmareste interzicerea rachetelor nucleare (balistice sau de croaziera) cu raza intermediara (500km-5.500km) lansate terestru. Racheta de croaziera testata de rusi, cunoscuta drept R-500 a fost lansata de pe o platforma Iskander modificata, sistemul fiind cunoscut drept Iskander-K. A nu se confunda cu celelalte versiuni Iskander care sint rachete balistice cu raza scurta de actiune.
Incalcarea prevederilor INF este un fapt grav insa SUA a reactionat relativ tarziu, acuzand oficial Rusia abia in 2014. E posibil ca declaratiile repetate ale rusilor referitoare la desfasurarea Iskander in Vest, amenintand Polonia si balticii, sa fi contribuit la asta. Capacitatea tehnica de a face acelasi lucru si in Crimeea si, in plus, stabilirea clara a obiectivului fortelor ruse (lovirea elementelor Scutului ABM) ar fi doar un motiv in plus.
Miscarile rusilor nu aveau cum sa treaca neobservate si tot in 2014, ca o recomandare pe marginea discutiei referitoare la NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act) 2015, comisia Camerei Reprezentantilor cerea intocmirea unui raport care sa analizeze vulnerabilitatea instalatiilor Aegis impotriva amenintarilor care ar incalca tratatul INF:
“The committee directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the Commander, U.S. European Command, the Commander, U.S. Central Command, and the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, to provide a report to the congressional defense committees, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives not later than September 1, 2014, detailing the following:
…
(2) The capability of the Aegis Ashore systems scheduled to be deployed to Romania and the Republic of Poland to detect Russian military systems that are inconsistent with or in circumvention of the INF treaty, and the appropriate types of interceptor missiles, including interceptor missiles other than the Standard Missile-3, that would be capable of defending allies and U.S. deployed forces from such Russian military systems that could be deployed at such Aegis Ashore sites, as well as a detailed explanation of any hardware and software changes required to those sites in order to provide a cruise-missile defense capability, and the costs of those changes;” (Sursa: house.gov)
Concluziile raportului au fost folosite ca baza pentru deciziile cuprinse in NDAA aferent anului (fiscal) 2016, care urmeaza sa primeasca votul final in aceste zile si care prevede ca:
“SEC. 1653. AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY AT NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION MISSILE DEFENSE SITES.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the relevant combatant command, should ensure that arrangements are in place, including support from other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to provide anti-air defense capability at all missile defense sites of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in support of phases 2 and 3 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach.
(b) REPORTS.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report describing—
(1) the plan to provide anti-air defense capability as described in subsection (a); and
(2) the contributions being made by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and members of such organization to support the provision of the capability described in such subsection. ” (Sursa:gpo.gov)
Desi foarte interesant din perspectiva politica, fragmentul de mai sus e destul de arid pe partea tehnica asa ca, pentru a afla ce se are de fapt in vedere, e necesar sa fie consultate notele (sub)comisiilor Camerei Reprezentantilor pe marginea aceleiasi legi:
“SEC. 1668. MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITY IN EUROPE.
(a) AEGIS ASHORE SITES.—
(1) POLAND.—The Secretary of Defense, in co-ordination with the Secretary of State, shall ensure that the Aegis Ashore site to be deployed in the Republic of Poland has anti-air warfare capability upon such site achieving full operating capability.
(2) ROMANIA.—The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall develop and implement a plan to provide anti-air warfare capability to the Aegis Ashore site deployed in the Republic of Romania by not later than December 31, 2018.
(3) EVALUATION OF CERTAIN MISSILES.—The Secretary shall evaluate the feasibility, benefit, and cost of using the evolved sea sparrow missile or the standard missile 2 in providing the anti-air warfare capability described in paragraphs (1) and (2).
(b) CAPABILITIES IN EUROPEAN COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY.—
(1) ROTATIONAL DEPLOYMENT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that a terminal high altitude area defense battery is available for rotational deployment to the area of responsibility of the United States European Command unless the Secretary notifies the congressional defense committees that such battery is needed in the area of responsibility of another combatant command.
(2) PRE-POSITIONING SITES.—The Secretary of Defense shall examine potential sites in the area of responsibility of the United States European Command to pre-position a terminal high altitude area defense battery.
(3) STUDIES.—
(A) Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall conduct studies to evaluate—
(i) not fewer than three sites in the area of responsibility of the United States European Command for the deployment of a terminal high altitude area defense battery in the event that the deployment of such a battery is determined to be necessary; and
(ii) not fewer than three sites in such area for the deployment of a Patriot air and missile defense battery in the event that such a deployment is determined to be necessary.
(B) In evaluating sites under clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall determine which sites are best for defending—
(i) the Armed Forces of the United States; and
(ii) the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
(4) AGREEMENTS.—If the Secretary of Defense determines that a deployment described in clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (3)(A) is necessary and the appropriate host nation requests such a deployment, the President shall seek to enter into the necessary agreements with the host nation to carry out such deployment. ” (Sursa: house.gov)
Concluzii:
1. Sint evaluate cel putin SM-2 (SM-6?) si ESSM, intr-o varianta maximala existand posibilitatea desfasurarii, prin rotatie, a unei baterii THAAD si/sau Patriot.
2. Exista deja termene limita, unele destul de stranse si deci va urma o perioada cu multe consultari si telefoane;
3. Formularea lasa sa se intelega ca, desi exista posibilitatea instalarii unor baterii americane, este preferata o varianta mai agresiva (din punct de vedere simbolic) a trimiterii unor sisteme NATO, dupa modelul desfasurarii sistemelor Patriot in Turcia de catre Germania si Olanda. Rezultatul tehnic poate fi acelasi insa problema este ridicata de la nivelul protectiei unor instalatii, in esenta, americane la cea a apararii unor state membre NATO cu capacitati furnizate de alti membrii NATO.
Termenul de Decembrie 2018 pentru instalarea capacitatii AAW la Deveselu este unul maximal si este perfect posibil ca din cauza accelerarii mobilizarii fortelor ruse in Crimeea el sa fie de fapt devansat.
E posibil ca jucand exclusiv pe cartea unor sisteme strict defensive, NATO sa isi rezerve suficient spatiu de manevra in viitor pentru a ridica miza, daca se va considera necesar, prin adoptarea de masuri simetrice.