Polonia a primit de curand ok-ul Departamentului de Stat sa achizitioneze un batalion de rachete tactice HIMARS. La fel ca in cazul Patriot multe negocieri pentru nimic, pentru ca la final (asa cum am mai scris) Varsovia n-a primit nici offset, nici vreun transfer tehnologic, cumpara sistemul exact asa cum il cumparam si noi: platesti cu cardul si curierul iti aduce batalionul acasa.
Evident, exista o diferenta de pret in (aparent macar) defavoarea Poloniei. Nu mai insistam pe sistemele Patriot, mergem direct la HIMARS.
Conform DSCA
Iordania 2015 – pentru comparatie
The Government of Jordan has requested a possible sale of 72 M31 Unitary Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) Rocket Pods (6 rockets per pod for a total of 432), support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical data, personnel training and equipment, systems integration support, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $192 million.
Finlanda 2015 – pentru comparatie
The Government of Finland has requested a possible sale of forty (40) Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Pods: Fifteen Pods of M31A1 Unitary Missiles (6 missiles per pod for a total of 90 missiles) and 25 Pods of M30A1 Alternative Warhead Missiles (6 missiles per pod for a total of 150 missiles). Also included are publications, personnel training and training equipment, software development, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistical and program support. The total estimated cost is $150 million.
Romania 2017 (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and Related Support and Equipment)
The Government of Romania has requested the possible sale of fifty-four (54) High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) Launchers, eighty-one (81) Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) M31A1 Unitary, eighty-one (81) Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) M30A1 Alternative Warhead, fifty-four (54) Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) M57 Unitary, twenty-four (24) Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems (AFATDS), fifteen (15) M1151A1 HMMWVs, Utility, Armored, and fifteen (15) M1151A1 HMMWVs, Armor Ready 2-Man. Also included with this request are: fifty-four (54) M1084A1P2 HIMARS Resupply Vehicles (RSVs) (5 ton, Medium Tactical Cargo Vehicle with Material Handling Equipment), fifty-four (54) M1095 MTV Cargo Trailer with RSV kit, and ten (10) M1089A1P2 FMTV Wreckers (5 Ton Medium Tactical Vehicle Wrecker with Winch), thirty (30) Low Cost Reduced Range (LCRR) practice rockets, support equipment, communications equipment, sensors, spare and repair parts, test sets, batteries, laptop computers, publications and technical data, facility design, training and training equipment, systems integration support, Quality Assurance Teams and a Technical Assistance Fielding Team, U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The total estimated program cost is $1.25 billion.
Polonia 2017 (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS))
The Government of Poland has requested to purchase sixteen (16) Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) M31A1 Unitary, nine (9) Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) M30A1 alternative warheads, sixty-one (61) Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) M57 Unitary. Also included are eight (8) Universal Position Navigation Units (UPNU), thirty-four (34) Low Cost Reduced Range (LCRR) practice rockets, one thousand six hundred forty-two (1,642) Guidance and Control Section Assemblies for GMLRS, Missile Common Test Sets and Devices, testing Precision, Lightweight GPS Receivers (PLGR), support equipment, U.S. Government and contractor services, training, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated cost is $250 million.
Polonia 2018 (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and Related Support and Equipment)
Poland has requested to buy twenty (20) High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) M142 Launchers, thirty-six (36) Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) M31 Unitary, nine (9) Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) M30A1 Alternative Warheads, thirty (30) Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) M57 Unitary, twenty-four (24) Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems (AFATDS), twenty (20) Multiple Launcher Pod Assembly M68A2 Trainers, twenty-four (24) M1151A1 High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), and nine (9) M1151A1 High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheel Vehicles (HMMWVs). Also included are twenty (20) Low Cost Reduced Range (LCRR) practice rockets, support equipment, communications equipment, spare and repair parts, test sets, batteries, laptop computers, publications and technical data, facility design, personnel training and equipment, systems integration support, Quality Assurance Teams and a Technical Assistance Fielding Team, United States Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services, and other related elements of logistics support, training, sensors, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated cost is $655 million.
Punand cumparaturile in perspectiva:
| Item | Romania 2017 | Polonia 2017 | Polonia 2018 | Iordania 2015 | Finlanda 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) M142 Launchers | 54 | 0 | 20 | 0 | 0 |
| Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) M31A1 Unitary | 81 | 16 | 36 | 72 | 15 |
| Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) M30A1 Alternative Warhead | 81 | 9 | 9 | 0 | 25 |
| Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) M57 Unitary | 54 | 61 | 30 | 0 | 0 |
| Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems (AFATDS) | 24 | 0 | 24 | 0 | 0 |
| M1151A1 HMMWVs, Utility, Armored | 15 | – | – | 0 | 0 |
| M1151A1 HMMWVs, Armor Ready 2-Man | 15 | – | – | 0 | 0 |
| M1084A1P2 HIMARS Resupply Vehicles (RSVs) | 54 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| M1095 MTV Cargo Trailer with RSV kit | 54 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| M1089A1P2 FMTV Wreckers | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low Cost Reduced Range (LCRR) practice rockets | 30 | 34 | 20 | 0 | 0 |
| Multiple Launcher Pod Assembly M68A2 Trainers | 0 | 0 | 20 | 0 | 0 |
| M1151A1 High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) | – | 0 | 24 | 0 | 0 |
| M1151A1 High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheel Vehicles (HMMWVs) | – | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| Guidance and Control Section Assemblies for GMLRS | – | 1642 | – | – | – |
| Universal Position Navigation Units (UPNU) | – | ? | – | – | – |
| Lightweight GPS Receivers (PLGR) | – | ? | – | – | – |
| Total | 1,250,000 kUSD | 250,000 kUSD | 655,000 kUSD | 192,000 kUSD | 150,000 kUSD |
Pentru a putea face o analiza este nevoie sa plecam de la o impartire a costurilor, care are la baza preturile. Lista de preturi de mai jos se bazeaza pe informatii publice, ele fiind considerate maximale.
- Vehicul, remorca: ~1000 kUSD
- ATACMS: 750-820-1100 kUSD; vom folosi estimarea de 1300 kUSD/lansator (racheta ?)
- M31: ~120 kUSD * 6 = 720 kUSD; maxim 2000 kUSD; vom folosi estimarea de 1000 kUSD/pachet
- M30: ~150 kUSD * 6 = 900 kUSD; maxim 2000 kUSD; vom folosi estimarea de 1000 kUSD/pachet
- HMMV: ~160 kUSD original, 250-341 kUSD noile variante in functie de protectie; vom folosi estimarea de 350 kUSD
- Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems (AFATDS) – 20 kUSD
- Low Cost Reduced Range (LCRR): 4.5 kUSD pe baza unui contract, 10 kUSD folosit
- Multiple Launcher Pod Assembly M68A2 Trainers: estimat la 100 kUSD
Reluam tabelul de mai sus, doar pentru Romania si Polonia, cu cantitati si sume estimate. Ne prezinta o imagine de ansamblu.
| Item | Romania 2017 | Polonia 2018 | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cantitate | Suma (kUSD) | Cantitate | Suma (kUSD) | |
| High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) M142 Launchers | 54 | 54,000 | 20 | 20,000 |
| Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) M31A1 Unitary | 81 | 81,000 | 36 | 36,000 |
| Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) M30A1 Alternative Warhead | 81 | 81,000 | 9 | 9,000 |
| Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) M57 Unitary | 54 | 70,200 | 30 | 39,000 |
| Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems (AFATDS) | 24 | 480 | 24 | 480 |
| M1151A1 HMMWVs, Utility, Armored | 15 | 5,250 | – | – |
| M1151A1 HMMWVs, Armor Ready 2-Man | 15 | 5,250 | – | – |
| M1084A1P2 HIMARS Resupply Vehicles (RSVs) | 54 | 54,000 | 0 | 0 |
| M1095 MTV Cargo Trailer with RSV kit | 54 | 54,000 | 0 | 0 |
| M1089A1P2 FMTV Wreckers | 10 | 10,000 | 0 | 0 |
| Low Cost Reduced Range (LCRR) practice rockets | 30 | 300 | 20 | 200 |
| Multiple Launcher Pod Assembly M68A2 Trainers | 0 | 0 | 20 | 2,000 |
| M1151A1 High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) | – | – | 24 | 8,400 |
| M1151A1 High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheel Vehicles (HMMWVs) | – | – | 9 | 3.150 |
| Total contract | 1,250,000 kUSD | 655,000 kUSD | ||
| Total fier | 415,480 kUSD | 118,230 kUSD | ||
| Diferenta (servicii) | 834,520 kUSD | 536,770 kUSD | ||
| communications equipment | ||||
| sensors | ||||
| spare and repair parts | ||||
| test sets | ||||
| batteries | ||||
| laptop computers | ||||
| publications and technical data | ||||
| facility design | ||||
| training and training equipment | ||||
| systems integration support | ||||
| Quality Assurance Teams and a Technical Assistance Fielding Team | ||||
| U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, logistics support services | ||||
| other related elements of logistics and program support | ||||
| personnel training and equipment | ||||
| United States Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services | ||||
| other related elements of logistics support | ||||
| training | ||||
Analiza
Astfel Romania va plati 1,25 miliarde de dolari pentru 54 de unitati de lansare (trei batalioane), 81 de seturi de rachete GMLRS M31A1 Unitary – 488 de rachete, 81 pachete GMLRS M30A1 Alternative Warhead – 488 rachete si 54 de rachete cu raza de 300km ATACMS M 57 Unitary, plus restul de hangarale.
Polonia va plati 655 milioane de dolari pentru 20 de unitati de lansare, 36 de pachete GMLRS Unitary – 216 rachete, 9 pachete M30A1 Alternative Warhead – 54 de rachete si 30 de ATACMS.
Daca facem o comparatie directa, pastrand proportile desigur, observam ca Romania iese in avantaj din cam toate punctele de vedere, astfel in cazul rachetelor M31A1 Unitary Romania va detine o medie de 9 rachete per lansator (488/54), Polonia aproape 11 rachete per lansator, in cazul rachetelor GMLRS M30A1 Alternative Warhead, noi pastram media de 9 rachete per masina (488/54), polonezii coboara dramatic la doar sub 3 rachete per lansator, in cazul ATACAMS noi avem un raport de 1:1, polonezii de 1:1,25.
Intrebarea care se pune este de ce atunci polonezii platesc cam 32,75 milioane de dolari per masina lansatoare (655 de milioane per batalion), iar Romania plateste doar 23,14 milioane de dolari per masina (416 milioane de dolari per batalion)?!
Ei bine, din datele de mai sus se poate observa potentialul vinovat, care de aceasta data este unul tehnic, fata de achizitia Patriot: pur si simplu orice achizitie de acest tip (atunci cand este de la zero – fara alte sisteme similare in dotare) implica niste costuri fixe.
Daca achizitionezi 54 de instalatii de lansare sau 20 (cazul Poloniei) aceste costuri fixe par sa fie aceleasi si, astfel, cei care cumpara mai multe sisteme isi impart costurile fixe pe mai multe batalioane, pretul per batalion fiind astfel mai mic.
De invatat din acesta diferenta de pret ar fi ideea ca nu renteaza sa cumperi un batalion (cu costuri fixe de peste 450 milioane de dolari) si este recomandat sa cumperi mai multe odata (tot in jur de 450 milioane costuri fixe). Polonezii, daca nu vor sa aiba cel mai scump HIMARS din lume, trebuie sa aiba in vedere achizitii ulterioare, pentru ca oricum ori cu 18 lansatoare, ori fara ele tot un drac…
Aceasta matematica simpla se aplica, evident, in cazul oricarei achizitii si arata in mod foarte clar banii aruncati pe geam in cazul achizitiilor de tip „bazar indian”. Nu este deloc indicat sa achizitionezi sisteme silmilare de la producatori diferiti pentru ca (pe langa cosmarul logistic si cu munitia) platesti si foarte mult la operationalizarea diferitelor sisteme (vezi „costurile fixe”).
Ca o diferenta intre noi si polaci, ei nu cumpara si camioanele grele aferente, incercand probabil sa monteze „fierataniile” pe Jeleczul local.
PS – Cu toate acestea nu e nimic sigur, planurile de finantare ale ministerului apararii polonez pentru 2019 nu prevad bani alocati catre HIMARS decat daca s-ar lua de la alte capitole.
Iulian
GeorgeGMT
„Polonezii, daca nu vor sa aiba cel mai scump HIMARS din lume…”
Too late!?!
Intre timp, asteptand si Deep Strike (RuMil)
Half the cost … Mi-ai adus aminte si de F15-X , nu prea inteleg cum e posibil jucarii noi
la jumatate de pret. Pai daca asa sta treaba , vreo 200 de deepstrike plus vreo 2 sau 3 escadrile de F15X si parca altfel as dormi noaptea !
Da nu ar fi rele 3 escadrile de F-15 X dar ce te faci ca lumea nu prea e de acord cu ele pt ca sunt scumpe dtpdv. Acum depinde cate avioane vor fi intr-o escadrila a FARo…12, 16 sau 18.
Nu e too late… Negocierile vor incepe dupa expirarea termenului de 15 zile. Prima data va veni oferta initiala, dupa care se negociaza si apoi sa ajunge la oferta finala.
E normal ca suma din notificare sa para aberanta – pentru ca include toate optiunile posibile. Polonezii nu le vor lua pe toate si sunt multe lucruri de negociat la oferta asta.
Ce e clar e ca s-a schimbat prim contractorul – la prima notificare era o achizitie de la un consortiu polonez cu Lockheed subcontractor, acum au decis sa mearga direct la americani.
Probabil polonezii au dubii ca firmele lor sunt in stare sa faca sistemul sau poate iesea de 3 ori mai scump decat daca il cumparau direct – sau poate vor doar sa compare optiunile posibile.
Poti sa o prezinti si ca pe un M31A1 cu raza marita pentru ca are incarcatura de lupta a rachetelor cal.227mm.
E un mix intre cea de 227mm si ATACMS.
noi am luat la pret de en-gros…:)…iese mai ieftin…
Cumperi mai mult iese ma ieftin la factua deci asta e secretu acu trebuie sa luam la bax palet si nu la duzina
Pai vad ca noi avem „comanda cea mai serioasa”.
E normal sa fie mai ieftin cand atingi cantitatile astea… americanii au in sange treaba asta. Cumperi putin e scump cumperi mult scade pretul.
Ca sa nu mai zic ca nu vad ce dracu sa negociezi. Acolo sunt niste tehnologii a caror dezvoltare a costat miliarde de $. Sa-ti faca tie transfer tehnologic ca sa ce? Noi nu mai putem taia doua table si e imposibil de gasit un strungar….. sa nu ne amagim.
Parca si vad microeletronica aia si mecanica fina adusa in niste hale unde ad neoanele pe tine….
Se aplica si la bateriile de coasta? Se aplica! De s-ar aplica si la f-16… că la corvete nu mai este cazul.
Atentie insa ca notificarile DSCA nu reprezinta un contract, ci cantitati de produse si preturi bugetare, neangajante pentru cele doua parti. Pe baza lor nu poti sa zici ce buni negociatori sunt unii sau ce prosti sunt altii pentru ca la momentul notificarii nu a avut loc nicio negociere.
Polonia a facut o prima cerere de oferta in 2017, in care PGZ era prim contractor iar LM era furnizor. Acum a facut alta cerere de oferta, pentru un contract direct inter-guvernamental.
Lockheed Martin a raspuns la cereri cu niste estimari de preturi, care insa, atentie, nu au nimic in comun cu pretul final pe care il vor plati polonezii. Nu ar fi exclus sa iasa mai scump acum, pentru ca si rolul LM va fi mai mare, daca consortiul local nu mai are rolul de prim contractor probabil multe din sarcinile sale vor fi preluate de LM.
Insa ce se publica la DSCA e doar baza de negociere pentru contract, e o treaba grosso modo pe care se ia aprobarea de principiu de la Departamentul de Stat. Aprobarea poate sa fie pe 650 milioane, dar contractul poate sa fie pe 10, 20, 100 milioane, etc.
Negocierea de abia urmeaza, etapa va incepe doar dupa ce trec 15 zile de la notificare, in care Congresul poate obiecta asupra vanzarii propuse.
Daca nu obiecteaza Congresul, urmeaza emiterea unei oferte (Letter of Offer and Acceptance) de catre furnizor. Pe baza acestei oferte are loc etapa de negociere linie cu linie, care se concretizeaza intr-o oferta finala din partea furnizorului care poate fi acceptata sau respinsa de beneficiar si apoi se semneaza contractul cu beneficiarul.
Deci mai sunt inca 2 pasi de negociere incepand cu momentul publicarii notificarii DSCA.
As adauga ca nici nu stim exact ce a cumparat Romania din shopping list anuntat in DSCA si nici nu stim la ce pret au luat ce au luat, pentru ca nu am vazut publicat nicarieri oferta finala sau contractul – si probabil vorbim de chestii confidentiale care nu vor fi publicate.
E explicat mai pe larg aici:
https://www.defence24.com/industry/the-us-gives-green-light-to-homar-phase-i-himars-squadron-without-an-offset
The State Department agreed to sell 20 HIMARS launchers to Poland, along with the rockets, and the auxiliary equipment package. The maximum transaction value has been defined as USD 655 million (net). No offset has been taken into account here.
According to the release issued by DSCA, Poland received a consent to procure the following:
20 HIMARS launchers (probably for a single 18-vehicle squadron plus two training platforms);
36 GMLRS Unitary missile packages with explosive/fragmentation warheads, 6 rockets in each, 216 rockets in total;
9 GMLRS Alternative Warhead rockets, with warheads designed to act against surface targets, 6 rockets each, 54 rockets in total;
30 ATACMS Unitary tactical effectors;
33 HMMWV vehicles (probably to be used as the command platforms);
24 AFATDS fire control system packages;
20 LCRR training rockets, 6 rockets in each package (120 rockets in total);
Communication systems package, training system package, maintenance support, spares etc.
DSCA Agency stressed that the maximum value of the agreement is USD 655 million. The US Congress has been notified about the transaction and, as in any other case of FMS acquisition (see phase I of the Wisla programme) it has 15 days to withhold the process. In practical terms, however, the above scenario seems unlikely. Following this date Poland is going to receive LOA (Letter of Offer and Acceptance) intergovernmental agreement. Then, line by line review negotiation is going to take place. Next, once the content of the Agreement is set, the Poles will receive a LOA (final offer) signed by the other party. This offer may be then accepted or rejected by the Polish Ministry of Defence.
Comparatia era intre anunturile DSCA pentru a avea o baza comuna de comparatie, la nivelul ballpark.
Costul exact devine public pe baza platilor facute de guverne; sint informatii publice. Ce anume se cumpara exact, linie cu line, nu putem sti. Dar anuntul DSCA da o imagine despre ce va fi furnizat.
Da, asa e. Doar ca nu se poate extrapola dintr-o cerere initiala de oferta cine a negociat mai bine – pentru simplul fapt ca nu a negociat nimeni la momentul anuntului DSCA, chiar daca ar fi vrut careva, nici nu aveau voie producatorii sa negocieze fara acordul Departamentului de Stat. Au voie doar sa faca niste oferte initiale, care de obicei sunt departe de cele finale si includ toate optiunile posibile dintr-un contract, ca sa nu se mai intoarca inapoi pentru vreo aprobare – insa nimeni care e intreg la cap sau nu sta pe miliarde de petro-dolari nu cumpara toate optiunile posibile.
Unele guverne folosesc cererile DSCA si pentru motive bugetare – sa stie cam de cati bani au nevoie si baga maxim la cererea de oferta, dupa care cand primesc oferta comerciala incep sa taie din linii si ajung la bugete mult mai realiste si finantabile.
Altfel, cand se ajunge la contract, depinde de client. In unele tari, gen SUA, poti sa vezi bugetarea destul de transparent, pana la linie de buget. Insa in Romania si in multe alte tari nu apar astfel de informatii.
Pai tocmai asta spune articolul si anume, ca in pofida unei aparente diferente de pret in favoarea noastra, costurile sunt cam la fel, „necazul” polonezilor venind de la costurile fixe si din faptul ca ei cumpara mai putine „acareturi”…
Adica avem cam aceleasi preturi.
Pai e normal sa fie aceleasi preturi, tinand cont ca sunt preturi estimate, grosiere, oferite cu scopul obtinerii aprobarilor de export si nu preturile negociate finale. Partea proasta e ca nici nu vom afla ce vor negocia fiecare si la ce pret pentru ca nici Polonia, nici Romania nu sunt tari cu transparenta bugetara.
Vom afla probabil pretul, suma totala a contractului, dar nu vom cunoaste oferta negociata in detaliu pe linii bugetare in tarile astea foste comuniste.
De obicei, aceste negocieri sunt la sange pentru ca bugetele sunt foarte limitate iar nevoile sunt multe.
Daca luam Romania ca exemplu, cu o floare nu se face primavara. Ne trebuie dotare in adancime, de la uniforma, arma de infanterie, pana la avioane.
Nu ar fi rau sa invatam o lectie de la Putin, care a modernizat armata rusa incepand cu soldatul, arma si armura sa si numai dupa ce a terminat cu el a trecut la sisteme mai complexe.
Noi vom avea Patriot si nu se stie cum vom reusi sa-l asimilam, HIMARS fara cine stie ce munitie smart si fara a asigura asimilarea tehnologiilor, munitiilor si a suportului. La o treaba din asta de artilerie trebuia sa implici industria nationala de la inceput – Romarm sa faca bombe, Aerostar sa asigure suportul sistemului, etc. Daca nu esti in stare sa faci munitia de artilerie mai bine economisesti banii si te apuci de altceva, ca sistemul va fi complet inutil, ce sa faci cu cateva zeci de proiectile de fiecare lansator, alea se consuma in cateva ore intr-un conflict. Am impresia ca nici macar proiectile pentru LAROM nu producem.
Achizitiile astea par facute pe sistem arabesc si nu sunt prea optimist in privinta lor, sper sa ma insel. Emiratele si sauditii nu ar trebui sa fie modelul nostru – mai degraba m-as lua dupa polonezi ca astia sunt tot niste estici ca noi dar mai luminati in lucrurile astea.
Cumperi mai mult iese ma ieftin la factua deci asta e secretu acu trebuie sa lom la bax palet si nu la duzina
da, e si normal sa fie asa, pentru ca unele din costuri sunt fixe, chiar daca cumperi una bucata, respectiv costurile de overheads – costurile de administrare a programului, de management de proiect, costurile de inginerie – non-recurring costs, etc.
Tot pentru comparatie, Slovacia a batut palma ptr 14 bucati F16 Block 70/72 ( ultimul racnet) contra 1,58 mil.La pachet cu tot ce mai trebuie, vezi :
http://www.aviatiamagazin.com/aviatie-militara/slovacia-a-semnat-contractul-pentru-achizitia-a-14-avioane-f-16-viper/
Pai asa ar fi bine sa se faca si cu restul… inclusiv in cazul productiei locale…
De ce nu cumparam 10 corvete in loc de doar 4??
Si 6 fregate in loc de doar 3??
Si 10 submarinute in loc de doar 3…
Guidance and Control Section Assemblies for GMLRS 1642 , pentru un necunoscător ….Ce făc ce astea ?
Sistemul de ghidare si control al traiectoriei rachetei, conform teoriei proiectarii si constructiei rachetelor.
Polonezii doreau initial sa fabrice ei mare parte din racheta (motorul, suprafetele de control, capul de lupta) primind din US doar sistemul se ghidare. US nu au fost de acord cu offset/transfer de tehnologie/fabricare locala.
Dacă industria și tehnica le permite ar putea fi folosițe pe alte tipuri de rachete pentru alte sisteme mă rog gen laromurile noastre ? întreb ca un necunoscator ….
@Iulian
Artimetica nu se pupa cu ce ne spune Uncle Sam. Cel putin in cazul Romaniei. „Fierul” costa $900 de milioane.
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/10/24/2017-22984/arms-sales-notification
In cazul Poloniei, nu stim inca pentru ca instiintarea catre Congres nu a fost publicata inca, dar o avem pe cea din 2017.
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/12/08/2017-26454/arms-sales-notification
Calcule „babesti: de acest gen nu sunt prea folositoare atata timp cat nu stim ce „Contract Line Items/CLINs” sunt stipulate in contract. Poti face un acest fel de exercitiu daca stii din ce fel de CLINs consta un contract si ai o mult mai mare precizie.
@Alex
Aritmetica lui Iulian este corecta: cumperi mai mult odata, platesti mai putin. Si mai are dreptate si in ce priveste „bazarul indian”.
Iar in baza acestui rationament corect, apar urmatoarele intrebari logice:1.pot sistemele HIMARS sa traga rachetele antinava pe care le vrem? 2.pot corvetele/fregatele sa traga si ele aceste rachtete? Ca daca da, atunci de ce naiba ne penibilizam in licitatii pe care le lansam doar ca sa le anulam?
Aritmetica lui Iulian iti indica o „delta” de mai bine de 100% in estimarea preturilor pentru „fier” si ce iti indica Uncle Sam.
Alex, era vorba de comparatia cu Polonia.
Si am plecat de la presupunerea ca diferenta de pret/bucata intre cele doua achizitii nu e mai mare de 5%.
Alex, se stie ©™® si a fost in nenumarate rinduri demonstrat ca presupunerea este mama esecului. Am plecat de la niste premise/estimari care puteau sau nu sa fie aproape de realitate. Este sigur nevoie de o continuare a articolului, o versiune 2.0, dupa ce aflam mai multe (de exemplu negocierea contractului).
MDE nu include nimic altceva in afara fierului? Licente? Intergrari?
Scopul era o incercare de a vedea din nou (daca mai era cazul, pentru a multa oara) ca a cumpara in loturi mici cite ceva este reteta sigura pentru a avea costuri mai mari.
Vorbind de preturi, sa detaliez estimarile:
– in 2011 130 ATACMS au costat 145 mil USD (Block 1A export version T2K unitary guided missile launching assemblies) – am considerat un pret de 1300 kUSD;
– HMMV cu protectie imbunatatita avea in 2011 un pret de 210 kUSD; adus la zi si cu protectie noua l-am socotit la 350 kUSD;
– preturile pentru M30 si M31 sunt de asemenea obtinute pe baza achizitiilor efectuate in trecut;
– preturile estimate pentru camioane si remorci sint de 1 mil USD bucata, in ideea ca daca difera se niveleaza pina la un punct;
– rachetele cu raza scurta de actiune sint de asemenea estimate pe baza unui contract.
Cind ajungem insa la sistemele de comunicatii, software si calculatoare e ceata, pentru ca:
– nu exista informatii publice despre preturi
– nu exista informatii daca e inclusa sau nu si integrarea
Daca ai informatii mai corecte sau actuale referitor la costurile individuale, te rog sa impartasesti.
Ca o concluzie, este un punct de vedere referitor la beneficiul achizitiilor in cantitati mai mari.
Costurile/Preturile pentru GMLRS, ATACMS si HIMARS in general le gasesti aici incepand cu pagina 99:
https://www.asafm.army.mil/documents/BudgetMaterial/FY2019/missiles.pdf
Preturile pentru vehicule le gasesti aici:
https://www.asafm.army.mil/documents/BudgetMaterial/FY2019/opa1.pdf
Preturile pentru AFATDS, radiouri, etc. probabil le vei gasi aici:
https://www.asafm.army.mil/documents/BudgetMaterial/FY2019/opa2.pdf
Tot ce tine de achizitii pentru US Army le gasesti aici:
https://www.asafm.army.mil/offices/bu/content.aspx?what=BudgetMaterials
MDE in general reprezinta „hardware”, restul de servicii este la „other.” In circumstante normale nu are cum serviciile si „one time fixed costs outisde of hardware” sa reprezinte doua treimi din din costul total al achizitiei. Se fac anumite investitii in infrastructura care o mica parte sunt include in costul de achizitie, dar asta nu inseamna ca ele sunt incluse in acest pret. Este ca si cum ai achizitiona un F-35 si incepem sa adunam toate costurile necesare pentru a pune in loc o anumita infrastructura care ar asigura operarea corespunzatoare a sistemului achizitionat (piste noi, hangare, simulatoare, etc.). Poti aplica procentajele care reies din calculele tale to costul total al programului pe o perioada de 20, 25, 30 de ani unde costurile de operare si intretinere (O&M) reprezinta cam doua treimi din costul total al programului.
Multam. Arunc un ochi pe ele.
E momentul sa trec temporar la TOR. Nu am acces la documente (This site can’t be reached/ERR_CONNECTION_TIMED_OUT).
Cum pot fi vizualizate documentele de pe site-ul pus de Alex?
Adobe Acrobat, daca ai acces la site. Daca nu, devine mai dificil. Nu avem ceva de genul Dropbox pentru a viziona, dar Iulian si George au documentele si ar putea sa le publice intr-un anumit fel.
Alex, multumesc pentru ele; mi le-a trimis George.
Man olescu: cele la care se referea Alex sunt:
https://rom.s3.nl-ams.scw.cloud/opa1.pdf
https://rom.s3.nl-ams.scw.cloud/opa2.pdf
https://rom.s3.nl-ams.scw.cloud/opa34.pdf
https://rom.s3.nl-ams.scw.cloud/missiles.pdf
Le voi urca si pe restul.
Adobe Acrobat Reader de fapt.
Multumesc de raspuns si de documente. Prin FMS Romania cumpara produsele la acelasi pret cu care le cumpara DoD de la producator? Daca da, atunci posibil sa iesim mai ieftin la „fiare” si per total contractul sa fie mai mic de 1.25 miliarde (mai raman ceva bani pt alte achizitii).
N-am cumparat cantitati mici pentru costuri. Am facut- o ca, la un budget mic, „sa fie de o ciorba si o friptura pentru toata lumea”. Nu stiu cum se cheama asta pe la noi, dar la tari decadent din occident se catalogheaza drept coruptie si incompetenta
Incerc sa las factorul uman deoparte si sa ma uit doar la ce inseamna intretinerea si pastrarea in functiune a 12 MRAP Cougar, 60 MRAP MaxxPro, 16 Panhard, 120 HMMWV, 60 Vamtac. Si, daca vrei: 30 Piranha IIIC, 60 de Zimbri, 160 TAB-77, xx Piranha V, yy Agilis.
Edit: si 4 AN-26 si 2 AN-30.
Sunt curios cum v-om proceda noi atunci cand o sa cumparam tancuri
1-2 batalioane sau 6 batalioane dintr-un foc
pai deja procedam… cautand 60 de bucati: 54 + 6 pentru scoala:
https://www.rumaniamilitary.ro/leopard-2-contra-altor-feline
https://armyrecognition.com/november_2018_global_defense_security_army_news_industry/romania_to_buy_60_new_main_battle_tanks.html
O singura mentiune. Nu cumperi „fier” si „servicii”. Cumperi access la tehnologii pe care nu esti in stare sa le dezvolti singur. Platesti un premium la pretul de fabricatie. Care este functie de ce cumperi, de ce relatii ai cu tara furnizoare si de ce pretentii de transfer de tehnologii manifest. Daca esti figurant ca polonezii plates in plus pentru spectacol. E greu sa ersimezi cat e premium-ul. In exemplele de mai sus, ce-I drept pentru variant diferite s-au platit pt GMRLS – doar munitie, 625 k Finlanda si 333k Iordania.
Ceea ce na aduce la alta problema. Himars este o reusita pentru noi, ofera capabilitatea fevlivire in adancime pe care aviatia noastra nu o are ( si nici n-o va avea prea curand). Problema e ca la asemenea preturi nu este pentru noi si solutia pentru support cu foc indirect la nivel tactic. Trbuie sa mentinem si eventual sa dezvoltam Larom si urmasii sai. Ma refer in special la dezvoltarea capacitatii de productive integrate a unei rachete de mass, urmas al Grad. Si ma refer, nu pe hartie, in relitatea stocurilor.
Altfel Himars ajunge doar pentru primele doua zile de razboi.
Himars este o reusita pentru noi, ofera capabilitatea fevlivire in adancime pe care aviatia noastra nu o are ( si nici n-o va avea prea curand). Trbuie sa mentinem si eventual sa dezvoltam Larom si urmasii sai. Ma refer in special la dezvoltarea capacitatii de productive integrate a unei rachete de mass, urmas al Grad.
100% de acord.
excelenta observatie, Himars e alta liga si pentru alte scopuri si e cu bataie lunga inclusiv pentru vectorii anti-navali si AA care vor fi dezvoltati, nu un simplu inlocuitor pentru LAROM.
Off Topic
Se pare ca ai nostri tot nu vor sa se lase de magarii :
https://adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/licitatia-35-miliarde-lei-camioanele-armatei-contestata-instanta-1_5c128f7fdf52022f75703ac9/index.html
July 20 this year Minister Mariusz Błaszczak decided to change the rules for the implementation of the Lobster program. The Defense Ministry resigned from the purchase of the system in Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa. Instead, direct negotiations were started with the US government in order to implement the program based on the HIMARS system (Changing the formula and accelerating the Homar program, 2018-07-20, Lobster is entering the implementation stage, 2018-10-19). In public speeches of politicians there were references to Romania, which a few months earlier bought three missile artillery squads in the US Army configuration, with minimal modifications.
On October 19, 2018, the Ministry of Defense informed about submission of a formal offer inquiry (LoR) at the Pentagon for the purchase of the first squadron. According to information provided by the State Department to the US Congress, Poland applied for the purchase of 20 launchers M142 HIMARS (18 for the squadron plus 2 for training in the CSAiU), 36 containers with M31 missiles (with Unitary warhead, six shells, total 216 effectors), 9 containers with Alternative Warhead missiles (M30 for surface targets, a total of 54 missiles), 30 ATACMS M57 missiles, 24 fire control systems (AFATDS), 20 containers with reduced range missiles (LCRR, 120 copies total) and 35 M1151A1 HMMWV vehicles.
Poland is also to receive auxiliary equipment, communications, spare parts, test kits, batteries, laptops, publications and technical data. The Americans will also provide facility design, staff training and equipment, system integration support and logistical support. The estimated cost of purchase is USD 655 million (over PLN 2.5 billion), although the latter can not be considered as final.
According to the LoR analysis, the defense department does not want to buy a squadron in a standard configuration. It lacks, for example, 5-ton trucks with trailers for transporting ammunition or technical evacuation vehicles. It can be assumed that the Defense Ministry intends to use Polish Jelcze in this role.
We also do not want to buy the latest versions of the GMLRS family missiles, but a bit older, and therefore cheaper (perhaps counting on supplies developed in the United States of the next generation of effectors for subsequent squadrons). Finally, instead of the 7-field Humvee with the command system, the Polish side wants to acquire such 24 vehicles and additionally another 9 (instead of 3) workshop cars on the chassis of the same cars.
However, the biggest doubts are related to the command system. American military doctrine assumes dominance or at least an advantage in the air of its own aviation. Hence, the risk of loss of the grouping of its own land forces as a result of the action of hostile aviation is small, as is the possibility of an effective reconnaissance by the opponent. Therefore, the US Army artillery system – AFATDS Raytheon – is not fully mobile, is based on high-capacity commanders, and the equipment is only carried by off-road Humvee. In the case of HIMARS sets, this gives another significant value: reduction of weight and dimensions of vehicles, which are therefore easier to transport by air. However, the price is long development and rolling time, as well as poor protection against fire or lack of effective operation after using mass weapons destruction.Meanwhile, Polish planners assume that we will be forced to operate in conditions of a lack of advantage in the air. This was the case during the communist era, after 1990, when we were a neutral state and now. In the event of a conflict, we will not be able to take advantage of the Alliance’s air force as a NATO border country until the multi-layered anti-aircraft defenses of a potential enemy are overcome.
This, in turn, enforces maximum mobility to avoid the opponent’s strikes. In the case of artillery, this translates into the principle of data preparation for shooting in motion, based on various means of reconnaissance, including bsl and artillery radars, and then stopping, firing a few salvos and leaving the station quickly. Everything should not take more than 2-3 minutes.
What’s more, in such a scenario Polish artillery units must be maximally self-sufficient. Hence, in the units of their own reconnaissance systems (and not based only on the indications of supported sub-units of land forces), extensive logistics and the ability to service weapons in field conditions.
However, the most important element is the native command system, developed since 1994 TOPAZ from WB Electronics. It is installed in command and staff vehicles, command and each department. As a consequence, even if an element is eliminated in the chain of command, its role may be taken over by another.
TOPAZ is consistently developed, on average every year two new functionalities are added to it. The latest variety – installed in company automatic mortar modules Rak – is an Integrated Fight Management System, combining fire control, command and planning systems, as well as logistics or cooperation with aviation. In essence, it is a comprehensive BMS of a multidimensional battlefield. And this type of solution was to be implemented for the lobster rocket artillery squadrons.Therefore, if you buy a HIMARS squadron with the AFATDS system, it will mean a recession in the artillery use philosophy for several decades. Not to mention exposing soldiers to unnecessary risk. This decision should be considered extremely unfavorable.
A certain way out of this situation may be the purchase of new generation systems, which the Americans began to develop based on the experience of fighting in the Donbas. The US Army has already decided to withdraw from AFATDS and develop a new solution. The order was awarded to a small company Leidos, which according to the agreement should provide the product in 2020. Due to delays, it is assumed that it will not be earlier than in 2021. This change has also forced the modernization of the fire control system HIMARS, produced by Lockheed Martin. The company is already implementing the appropriate program.
However, the purchase of the American system, even if it meets the operational requirements of the Polish Army, would lead to the introduction of an alternative solution to the service. Firstly, it would lead to the loss of a uniform command system, and secondly it would require the creation of an overlay that would allow the HIMARS / LVAR squad system to communicate with the rest of the Polish artillery.
Meanwhile, the use of TOPAZ is still possible. Representatives of WB Electronics invariably declare that they will develop a variant for long-range artillery within 1.5 years. What’s more, it can be easily integrated with HIMARS launchers and the Lockheed Martin fire control system, which was determined during negotiations in 2016-2017
And this is not the end of differences … best regards!